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NOTE
Missouri’s New Green Standard or Gray
Area? What Facts and Evidence Missouri
Courts Must Consider in Summary
Judgment Motions
Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Clayton A. Voss*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, it has become routine for Missouri
litigators to cite ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply
Corp. as Missouri’s summary judgment standard.1 It has remained one of
the Supreme Court of Missouri’s most cited opinions regarding summary
judgment despite revisions to Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure
74.04(c)(1)–(2) in 1994 – one year after ITT interpreted and applied the
previous version of the rule.2 In August 2020, the Supreme Court of
Missouri revised ITT’s outdated guidance on what constitutes the record
upon which trial courts must rely when deciding motions for summary
judgment.3 Green v. Fotoohighiam was the Supreme Court of Missouri’s
first time clarifying these rules and the first time that the court formally
overruled parts of ITT and cases applying it.4 In doing so, the court

*B.S.Acc & M.Acc, University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of

Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member & Lead Articles Editor Missouri
Law Review, 2020–2022. I am grateful to Professor Rigel C. Oliveri for her insight
and guidance during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for
its help in the editing process.
1
ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo.
1993) (en banc) (This case has over 13,000 citing references, including approximately
4,500 references in trial court documents, 4,500 references in appellate court
documents, and 2,300 references in cases (last visited Sept. 19, 2021)).
2
See Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 116 n.5 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
3
Id. at 116–21.
4
Street v. Harris, 505 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (main case applying
ITT, which the Green court overruled, particularly because the appellant’s argument
rested on Street).
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indicated that facts come into the summary judgment record only via
reference in a Rule 74.04(c) statement of uncontroverted material fact or
response thereto.5
Part II of this Note outlines the facts that led to the dispute in Green
and the court’s holding. Part III examines the development of summary
judgment law in Missouri, specifically, Rule 74.04(c) and the amendments
that led to its current form. It also discusses certain Missouri cases to
highlight the split authority among Missouri courts after the 1994
amendments to Rule 74.04: some courts continued to apply ITT’s
summary judgment standard, while others adopted the Green framework
even before it superseded ITT. Part IV summarizes the Green holding and
the court’s analysis. Finally, Part V discusses the potential impact of
Green on summary judgment practice in Missouri, including a comparison
of Missouri’s summary judgment practice under Rule 74.04 and Green
with summary judgment practice in federal courts under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56. It argues that precluding courts from having the option
to consider facts beyond only those properly referenced in Rule 74.04(c)
paragraphs and responses may result in undesirable outcomes and
incentives.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In Green, Plaintiff Marcia Green (“Plaintiff”) brought suit against
Defendants Mehrdad Fotoohighiam (“Defendant”), James Hall, David
Reed, Electenergy Technologies, Inc., and ETI, LLC for allegedly
conspiring to burn down her mobile home while she slept inside.6 On
December 15, 2014, Plaintiff awoke to noises coming from outside her
door.7 Once out of bed, Plaintiff realized her mobile home was on fire.8
To escape, she broke a window in her bedroom and climbed through it. 9
Plaintiff sustained several injuries, including lacerations, burns, and
respiratory complications attributable to smoke and carbon monoxide
inhalation.10 Additionally, her mobile home and all personal property
inside it were destroyed.11
Plaintiff sued Defendant, the owner of a mobile home adjacent to
Plaintiff’s lot, and the other defendants for conspiracy to set her mobile

5

Green, 606 S.W.3d at 121.
Id. at 114.
7
See First Amended Petition, Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113 (Mo.
2020) (en banc) (No. 15BA-CV02239), 2015 WL 13882186 [hereinafter First
Amended Petition, Green].
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 114 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
11
Id.
6
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home on fire.12 According to a witness, Defendant, angry after a “feud”
with Plaintiff, offered to pay Hall to set Plaintiff’s mobile home on fire.13
Plaintiff alleged their actions caused her physical and emotional harm and
property damage.14 Specifically, Plaintiff’s amended petition included
claims for negligent and reckless conduct, assault, battery, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and conspiracy.15
At the close of discovery, Plaintiff moved for partial summary
judgment on the question of liability, but not damages.16 Pursuant to Rule
74.04, Plaintiff included with her motion a statement of uncontroverted
material facts containing the following allegations in numbered
paragraphs: (1) Defendant owns a mobile home adjacent to Plaintiff’s lot;
(2) Scotty Christopher and James Hall performed work on Defendant’s
property; (3) Defendant offered Hall and Christopher five hundred dollars
to set Plaintiff’s mobile home on fire; (4) Defendant told a former
employee that he hired Hall and Reed to set Plaintiff’s mobile home on
fire; and (5) Plaintiff’s mobile home was actually burned down, causing
her damage.17 Plaintiff supported each numbered paragraph by reference
to deposition testimony or an affidavit.18
Although not cited or referenced by Plaintiff in her summary
judgment motion, included in addition to the cited evidence in support of
her statement of uncontroverted material facts were portions of
Defendant’s deposition testimony that contradicted some of Plaintiff’s
conspiracy allegations.19 Specifically, Defendant stated that he never met
the individuals allegedly involved in the conspiracy to burn down
Plaintiff’s mobile home:
Q: Have you ever met James Hall before?
A: Yes.
Q: Tell me when you first met James Hall?

12

Id.
First Amended Petition, Green, supra note 7.
14
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 114.
15
First Amended Petition, Green, supra note 7.
16
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 114.
17
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(1) (2008) (“A statement of uncontroverted material
facts shall be attached to the motion. The statement shall state with particularity in
separately numbered paragraphs each material fact as to which movant claims there is
no genuine issue, with specific references to the pleadings, discovery, exhibits or
affidavits that demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue as to such facts.”); Green, 606
S.W.3d at 114.
18
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 114–15.
19
Id. at 115.
13
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A: I take the 5th.
Q: Have you ever met David Reed?
A: No.
Q: Have you ever met Scotty Christopher?
A: Nope. 20

Defendant did not respond to Plaintiff’s motion, and the trial court
entered partial summary judgment as to liability in Plaintiff’s favor. 21 The
court noted Defendant’s failure to timely respond resulted in an admission
to all facts set forth in Plaintiff’s statement of uncontroverted facts.22 The
court also relied on the fact that Defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent when asked certain questions during his deposition;
therefore, it assumed any answers that Defendant would have given would
have been adverse to him.23 Ultimately, the court held that because
Defendant did not deny Plaintiff’s evidence presented in the motion for
summary judgment as required under Rule 74.04(c)(1), Plaintiff’s asserted
facts would be taken as true, and Plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.24
After a trial on the issue of damages only, the jury returned a verdict
of $250,000 in actual damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages.25
Defendant appealed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment,
arguing that the court must consider Plaintiff’s inclusion of Defendant’s
surplus, uncited deposition testimony. Defendant thus claimed that the
contradiction in the Plaintiff’s own filings created a genuine issue of
material facts sufficient to defeat her summary judgment motion. 26 The
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District denied Defendant’s
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.27 The Supreme Court of
Missouri affirmed the circuit court’s grant of partial summary judgment
on the issue of liability, holding that motions for summary judgment are
decided only on the facts – along with properly cited pleadings, discovery,
exhibits, or affidavits – referenced in Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and

20

Id.
Id.
22
See Green v. Fotoohighiam, No. 15BA-CV02239, 2017 WL 11567312, at *2
(Mo. Cir. Oct. 26, 2017).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 115 (“The jury returned a verdict of $250,000 in actual
damages and $2,500,000 in punitive damages.”).
26
Id.
27
Id.
21
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responses, not the entire trial court record.28 The Green holding
supersedes, or at least clarifies the meaning of, ITT’s longstanding rule
that a “genuine issue” sufficient to defeat summary judgment exists
“where the record contains competent materials that evidence two
plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts.”29

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The amendment of Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 74.04 in 1994 –
one year after the ITT decision – was meant to clarify and limit what
constitutes the summary judgment record to make it easier on courts
analyzing summary judgment motions. Instead, it created split authority
among Missouri courts prior to Green.

A. The Evolution of Rule 74.04 and the ITT Standard
Summary judgment in Missouri is governed by Missouri Rule of
Civil Procedure 74.04, which contains strict requirements for establishing
the uncontroverted material facts that may support summary judgment.30
In addition to requiring a movant to file a legal memorandum explaining
why summary judgment should be granted, Rule 74.04(c) instructs the
moving party to “state with particularity in separately numbered
paragraphs each material fact to which movant claims there is no genuine
issue, with specific references to the pleadings, discovery, exhibits or
affidavits that demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue as to such facts.”31
If the non-movant wishes to deny one of the movant’s facts, then they must
support the denial with references to admissible evidence.32 If a nonmovant fails to do so, the facts are deemed admitted as true.33
Missouri courts have had different interpretations of what facts and
evidence should be considered in deciding whether there are issues of
material fact and a legal right to judgment.34 The confusion is largely due

28

Id. at 118.
ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 382
(Mo. 1993) (en banc).
30
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04. (2008).
31
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(1).
32
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(2).
33
Id. (“A response that does not comply with this Rule 74.04(c)(2) with respect
to any numbered paragraph in movant's statement is an admission of the truth of that
numbered paragraph.”).
34
Compare, e.g., Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 508 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2016) (contending that “‘summary judgment rarely if ever lies, or can withstand
appeal, unless it flows as a matter of law from appropriate Rule 74.04(c) numbered
paragraphs and responses alone’”), with Street v. Harris, 505 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2016) (inconsistencies outside of Rule 74.04(c) numbered paragraphs and
responses to create a dispute of material fact).
29
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to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation and application of Rule
74.04 in ITT and its influential role in Missouri summary judgment
practice.35 In ITT, the Supreme Court of Missouri explained the burden
Rule 74.04 imposes on a movant for summary judgment.36 The moving
party must first show that there is no genuine dispute over the material
facts by “reference to the record when appropriate.”37 This, along with a
showing that the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”
establishes the movant’s right to summary judgment as required by Rule
74.04(c). 38 Then, the burden shifts to the non-movant to show that there
are disputed material facts in the record that make summary judgment
improper.39 The non-movant will only succeed in proving a genuine
factual dispute exists if the “record contains materials that evidence two
plausible, but contradictory, accounts of the essential facts.”40
Inconsistent authority in Missouri summary judgment practice
leading up to Green emerged over the issue of when a genuine factual
dispute exists.41 In other words, what constitutes the “record” for the court
to consider, and when does the record evidence “plausible, but
contradictory, accounts”?42 According to ITT, courts should view the
record “in the light most favorable to the non-movant,” which means that
“any evidence in the record that presents a genuine dispute as to the
material facts defeats the movant’s prima facie showing.”43 The ITT court
also noted that “materials submitted by the movant that are, themselves,
inconsistent on the material facts defeat the movant’s prima facie
showing.”44 Thus, under ITT’s framework, courts analyzing summary
judgment had an obligation to look to facts anywhere in the record in order
to determine if any genuine disputes of material fact existed, even if
neither the movant nor non-movant cited to such facts in their summary
judgment filings.45

35

ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380–
82 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
36
Id. at 382.
37
Id. at 380.
38
Id. at 381.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 382.
41
Compare Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 508 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Mo. Ct. App.
2016) (contending that “‘summary judgment rarely if ever lies, or can withstand
appeal, unless it flows as a matter of law from appropriate Rule 74.04(c) numbered
paragraphs and responses alone’”), with Street v. Harris, 505 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2016) (inconsistencies outside of Rule 74.04(c) numbered paragraphs and
responses to create a dispute of material fact).
42
ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 854 S.W.2d at 380.
43
Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
44
Id.
45
Id.
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It is important to note that when ITT was before the Supreme Court
of Missouri, there was a different version of Rule 74.04 in effect than at
the time of Green.46 Unlike the current iteration of Rule 74.04, the prior
version did not require the movant to submit a separate statement of
uncontroverted material facts or to attach specific exhibits in support of
the summary judgment motion.47 Rule 74.04 was amended in 1994 to
require the movant’s motion to “state with particularity in separately
numbered paragraphs each material fact as to which the movant claims
there is no genuine issue, with specific references to the pleadings,
discovery or affidavits that demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue as to
such facts.”48 If a non-movant wishes to deny one of the movant’s facts,
they must support the denial with references to admissible evidence.49 The
1994 amendments made clear that the consequence of failing to timely
respond to a motion for summary judgment is that the movant’s statement
of uncontroverted material facts is deemed admitted.50

B. Cases Applying Post-ITT Amendments to Rule 74.04 Created a
Divergence in Authority on What Constitutes the Summary Judgment
Record
In a 2001 case, Osage Water Co. v. City of Osage Beach, the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Southern District explained the rationale behind
the 1994 amendments to Rule 74.04.51 The court stated that the desire to
“clearly advise[e] opposing parties and the court of the basis for a motion
for summary judgment” led the Supreme Court of Missouri to amend Rule
74.04 to “require particularity in motions for summary judgment with
specific references to the pleadings, discovery or affidavits” that
demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of material facts.52 The court noted
that the amended Rule also required specificity in the response to the
summary judgment motion, including that the non-movant’s response
must contain “a statement of each additional material fact that remains in
46

Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 116 n.5 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Id.; MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c) (2008) (“The motion shall state with particularity
the grounds therefor and shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the
hearing. Prior to the day of hearing the adverse party may serve opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought shall be entered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”).
48
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 116 n.5; MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(1) (1994).
49
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(2).
50
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c).
51
Osage Water Co. v. City of Osage Beach, 58 S.W.3d 35, 44 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001).
52
Id.
47

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 4 [2022], Art. 12

1412

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

dispute with references to where each such fact appears in the pleadings,
discovery or affidavits.”53 The Southern District further clarified that
“Rule 74.04(c)’s now-familiar format of numbered paragraphs and
responses” was implemented after ITT “to assist the judge in ruling on
summary judgment motions by requiring such motions to conform to a
specific form that will reveal the areas of dispute.”54 Thus, the
inconsistency regarding what body of facts courts should rely on when
deciding motions for summary judgment stems from the fact that ITT –
requiring judges to look through the entire record to identify factual
disputes – guided summary judgment practice in Missouri for almost three
decades, despite subsequent amendments to Rule 74.04(c) that sought to
focus the court’s attention to a summary judgment record consisting only
of the facts properly referenced in Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and
responses.55
In 2016, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
considered a situation similar to that in Green, where uncited portions of
deposition testimony attached to the summary judgment motion
contradicted the movant’s statement of uncontroverted facts.56 In Street v.
Harris, the plaintiff sued homeowners after their dog allegedly knocked
her down, causing a broken ankle.57 The homeowners filed a summary
judgment motion, which alleged in the statement of uncontroverted facts
that the dog had never previously knocked anyone down and had an
affidavit supporting that fact.58 When the plaintiff failed to respond, the
trial court deemed the fact admitted and entered judgment in the
homeowners’ favor.59
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because two of the exhibits attached to the
homeowners’ motion contained contrary statements regarding whether the
dog had ever knocked anyone down before and thus created a dispute of
material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.60 Accordingly, the
court considered whether it was required to overlook any inconsistency in
the exhibits attached to the homeowner’s summary judgment motion when
the plaintiff failed to respond, which constitutes an admission of the
53

Id.
Pemiscot Cty. Port Auth. v. Rail Switching Serv., Inc., 523 S.W.3d 530, 533
(Mo. Ct. App. 2017).
55
ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 380–
82 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 116 & n.5 (Mo.
2020) (en banc) (“Summary judgment practice in Missouri is governed by Rule 74.04
and this Court's decision in [ITT].”).
56
Street v. Harris, 505 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
57
Id. at 415.
58
Id. at 416.
59
Id. at 415.
60
Id. at 416.
54
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homeowners’ statement of uncontroverted facts.61 Relying on ITT’s
interpretation of Rule 74.04, the court of appeals applied a broad view of
what materials may be considered by the courts under Rule 74.04(c) and
reversed summary judgment rather than confining its review of the facts
to the numbered paragraphs in the statement of uncontroverted facts.62
Street was not the only Missouri case to hold that even where a nonmovant fails to respond, the motion and supporting evidence must still on
its own establish a right to judgment before the trial court can properly
grant summary judgment.63
A recent decision from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District was critical of Street’s reliance on ITT’s interpretation of an
outdated version of Rule 74.04.64 In Fidelity Real Estate Co. v. Norman,
a landlord sued two tenants after the tenants breached a residential lease
contract.65 The landlord filed motions for summary judgment against the
tenants individually, both of which the circuit court sustained.66 On
appeal, the tenants argued, pursuant to Street, that the circuit court erred
in granting summary judgment because an exhibit attached to the
landlord’s motion for summary judgment contained an inconsistency that
created a genuine issue of material fact.67 While Fidelity Real Estate
differed from Green in that one of the tenants replied to the landlord’s
motion for summary judgment, her denials were insufficient – she failed
to support her denials with specific references to discovery, exhibits, or
affidavits as required by Rule 74.04(c)(2).68 Because the tenants failed to
properly respond, the Fidelity Real Estate court refused to look to the
allegedly contradictory exhibit to determine if a genuine issue of material
fact existed and affirmed the trial court.69
In its analysis, the Fidelity Real Estate court recognized that the 1994
amendments to Rule 74.04 limited a court’s review from “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits,”70 as allowed under the old version, to only “the

61

Id.
Id. at 418.
63
See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reynolds, 348 S.W.3d 858, 862 (Mo. Ct. App.
2011) (“The inconsistency in the Bank’s own documents attached to the motion, in
and of itself is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence
of a contract between Reynolds and the Bank and genuine issue of material fact as to
what the terms of any alleged contract may be between the parties.”).
64
See Fidelity Real Est. Co. v. Norman, 586 S.W.3d 873 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 877.
67
Id. at 879.
68
Id. at 886.
69
Id.
70
MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c) (1993).
62
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motion, the response, the reply and the surreply.”71 Thus, Street’s reliance
on ITT’s interpretation of an outdated version of Rule 74.04 was error.72
The Fidelity Real Estate court also recognized that Street’s interpretation,
which allowed consideration of the entire record, could potentially turn the
court into an advocate.73 The court went even further, stating that “Street
is an aberration, as cases from the Eastern District both before and after
Street emphasize that the scope of review at both the trial and appellate
levels is limited to the record developed through the procedural
requirements of Rule 74.04(c), i.e., the motion and response.”74
Peck v. Alliance General Ins. Co. is an example of such an Eastern
District case prior to Street. There, the court strictly confined the summary
judgment record to evidence properly referenced in Rule 74.04(c)
paragraphs and responses.75 The non-movant in Peck failed to file a
response in compliance with Rule 74.04(c) because it contained “only
unverified denials” and made no references to the record that showed the
existence of a genuine fact dispute.76 Therefore, all of the movant’s factual
assertions in the summary judgment motion were taken as true.77
Furthermore, that court rejected the non-movant’s argument that summary
judgment was inappropriate because uncited portions of the movant’s
deposition, as well as uncited portions of the movant’s petition in a
separate lawsuit, contradicted the movant’s claims.78 The Peck court
reasoned that the non-movant’s failure to refer to the movant’s deposition

71
Fidelity Real Est. Co., 586 S.W.3d at 883 (quoting MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(6)
(2019)).
72
Id.
73
Id. at 883 n.15 (“[R]equiring either the trial or reviewing court to examine the
entire record, rather than just those facts identified in the motion and response, could
easily place the court in the position of an advocate insofar as the court would have to
identify not only the material facts but also those that are subject to genuine dispute.”).
74
Id. at 883; see, e.g., Holzhausen v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 414 S.W.3d 488,
494 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (“A trial court grants or denies motions for summary
judgment on the basis of what is contained in the motion for summary judgment and
the responses thereto . . .. On appeal, our review is confined to the same facts and does
not extend to the entire record before the trial court . . .. We will not consider ‘facts’
that are not set out as ‘facts in dispute.’”); Ackman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 556 S.W.3d
80, 87 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018), transfer denied (Sept. 25, 2018) (In reviewing the grant
of summary judgment to employer on employee's claim of work-related injury, the
appellate court refused to consider portions of employee's medical records attached to
a motion for summary judgment where the employee/non-movant had not relied on
those portions of the medical records in opposing the grant of summary judgment and
had admitted in his summary judgment response that the medical records did not link
his injury to his work.).
75
Peck v. All. Gen. Ins. Co., 998 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
76
Id. at 75.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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or petition in its response to the summary judgment motion precluded both
documents from being part of the record relevant at the summary judgment
phase which, in turn, prevented the reviewing court from considering them
on appeal.79 The court held that “references to the record must appear in
[a] response” that complies with Rule 74.04(c)(2) in order to be considered
by a court in its summary judgment determination.80
As indicated in Fidelity Real Estate, further decisions by the Missouri
Court of Appeals tended to demonstrate that Street, and other cases that
relied on ITT’s interpretation of the old Rule 74.04, were “aberrations.” 81
The Fidelity Real Estate opinion relied on a 2016 case from the Court of
Appeals for the Southern District, Great S. Bank v. Blue Chalk Constr.,
LLC, in which the court adopted the strict application of Rule 74.04(c).82
In Blue Chalk, Great Southern Bank (“GSB”) filed suit against Blue Chalk,
alleging it failed to pay the balance on various promissory notes and
guaranties tied to loans GSB had extended to Blue Chalk.83 After Blue
Chalk answered the petition with a general denial and fifteen affirmative
defenses, it also filed counterclaims essentially mirroring GSB’s original
claims.84 GSB moved for summary judgment on all claims in its petition
and all of Blue Chalk’s counterclaims.85 The trial court entered summary
judgment in GSB’s favor on all claims.86
On appeal, Blue Chalk argued the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment because its counterclaims and affirmative defenses
created genuine issues of material fact.87 The Blue Chalk court affirmed
the trial court’s entry of summary judgment, reinforcing that the “summary
judgment record” consists of Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses.88
Blue Chalk described any reference beyond the Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs
as “analytically useless” for courts properly applying Rule 74.04,
specifically noting that allowing reviewing courts to look outside Rule
74.04(c) paragraphs and responses to find issues of material fact would
exceed de novo review by inviting courts to “look outside the…summary
judgment record.”89
79

Id. (citing MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(2), (e) (1994)).
Id. at 75–76.
81
Fid. Real Est. Co. v. Norman, 586 S.W.3d 873, 882 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019).
82
Great S. Bank v. Blue Chalk Constr., LLC, 497 S.W.3d 825, 836 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2016).
83
Id. at 829.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 830.
86
Id. at 832.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 836.
89
Id. at 835–36 (“[O]ur de novo decision on appeal must be in accordance with
all the requirements of Rule 74.04 and, therefore, must be made in the very same
manner the trial court should have applied that rule in the first instance.”).
80
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The inconsistency among Missouri courts regarding the scope of the
summary judgment record made it ripe for the Supreme Court of Missouri
to step in and provide guidance. In August 2020, the court took an
opportunity to address this issue in Green.90

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Green, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue
of liability and, in accordance with Rule 74.04(c), submitted a statement
of uncontroverted material facts in which she alleged that Defendant
offered five hundred dollars to two individuals to set her mobile home on
fire.91 Each numbered paragraph was supported by deposition testimony
or an affidavit.92 Because Defendant did not timely respond to the motion
for summary judgment, the trial court considered each of Plaintiff’s
alleged facts as undisputed and granted summary judgment.93 On appeal,
Defendant pointed to his deposition testimony included in Plaintiff’s
summary judgment filings where he denied having ever met the two
individuals who set the home on fire.94 Relying on Street, he argued that
a genuine issue of material fact existed because the deposition testimony
contradicted Plaintiff’s assertion that he knew the two individuals who
burned the home down.95 Thus, the issue before the Supreme Court of
Missouri mirrored that of Street – whether the trial court erred in granting
Plaintiff partial summary judgment because portions of Defendant’s
deposition testimony attached to Plaintiff’s statement of uncontroverted
material facts created an issue of material fact, even though Defendant
failed to respond to the summary judgment motion. 96 Simply put, Green
addressed what body of facts courts should rely on when considering
summary judgment motions.97
The Supreme Court of Missouri began its analysis by noting that ITT
and Rule 74.04 govern summary judgment practice in Missouri.98 Pulling
from ITT, the court reinforced that the movant has the burden of
“establish[ing] that there is no genuine dispute as to those material facts
upon which [she] would have had the burden of persuasion at trial.”99 To

90

Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
Id. at 114.
92
Id. at 114–15.
93
Id. at 115.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 117–18.
96
Id. at 116.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. (quoting ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. 854
S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 1993)).
91
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accomplish this showing, the moving party must attach to the summary
judgment motion a statement of uncontroverted material facts that
“state[s] with particularity in separately numbered paragraphs each
material fact as to which movant claims there is no genuine issue, with
specific references to the pleadings, discovery, exhibits or affidavits that
demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue as to such facts.” 100 The court
stated that after the movant makes this submission, the non-movant must
file a response either admitting or denying the movant’s material facts.101
Specifically, the court held that non-movants “must support denials with
specific references to discovery, exhibits, or affidavits demonstrating a
genuine factual issue for trial,”102 and any “facts not properly supported
under Rule 74.04(c)(2) or (c)(4) are deemed admitted.”103
Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded
that summary judgment principles require a court to “determine whether
uncontroverted facts established via Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and
responses demonstrate [movant’s] right to judgment regardless of other
facts or factual disputes.”104 The court referenced Jones v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., a Southern District Court of Appeals decision from 2016, for an
explanation of the summary judgment principles under Rule 74.04:105
[1] Facts come into a summary judgment record only via Rule
74.04(c)’s numbered-paragraphs-and-responses framework. [2]
Courts determine and review summary judgment based on that Rule
74.04(c) record, not the whole trial court record. [3] Affidavits,
exhibits, discovery, etc. generally play only a secondary role, and then
only as cited to support Rule 74.04(c) numbered paragraphs or
responses, since parties cannot cite or rely on facts outside the Rule
74.04(c) record. [4] [S]ummary judgment rarely if ever lies, or can
withstand appeal, unless it flows as a matter of law from appropriate
Rule 74.04(c) numbered paragraphs and responses alone.106

Critically, the court explained that these summary judgment
principles do not require the circuit court or any appellate court to sift
through the entire record to identify disputed issues; a court would thus be
100

Id. (quoting MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(1)).
Id. at 117.
102
Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) (quoting
Cent. Tr. & Inv. Co. v. Signalpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 422 S.W.3d 312, 320 (Mo.
2014) (en banc) (citing MO. R. CIV. P. 74.04(c)(2), (4) (2020))).
103
Id. at 116 (quoting Cent. Tr. & Inv. Co. v. Signalpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC,
422 S.W.3d 312, 320 (Mo. 2014) (en banc)).
104
Id. at 118 (quoting Pemiscot Cty. Port Auth. v. Rail Switching Servs., Inc.,
523 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017)).
105
Id. at 117–18.
106
Id. at 117–18 (quoting Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 508 S.W.3d 159, 161
(Mo. Ct. App. 2016)).
101
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acting impermissibly as an advocate for a party.107 The court ultimately
held that because the trial court had no obligation to look outside the
discovery, exhibits, and affidavits specifically referenced in Rule 74.04(c)
paragraphs and responses, it correctly determined the uncontroverted
material facts established Plaintiff’s right to partial summary judgment on
the issue of liability.108 The fact that the contradictory deposition
testimony was part of the entire record at the circuit court was irrelevant
because “motions for summary judgment are decided only on those facts
– along with properly cited pleadings, discovery, exhibits, or affidavits –
referenced in Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses, not the entire trial
court record.”109
The Green decision also took the opportunity to overrule Street.110
The court discussed other Missouri Court of Appeals cases that applied
Rule 74.04 in line with the Green framework and the current version of
the rule, specifically citing Fidelity Real Estate, Blue Chalk, and Peck.111
Green, like Fidelity Real Estate, recognized that the Eastern District of the
Court of Appeals had correctly applied Rule 74.04 in cases before and after
Street.112 Thus, the court declared that Street overlooked ITT’s application
of an outdated Rule 74.04 and that requiring a court to comb through the
entire record to determine if any disputed issues of material fact existed
would render the 1994 amendments to Rule 74.04 meaningless.113 Thus,
the Green court declared Street an outlier, among not only the other court
of appeals districts, but also among the Eastern District Court of Appeals’s
own decisions.114 The Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately held that
“any court – whether it be the circuit court addressing summary judgment
in the first instance or an appellate court reviewing an entry of summary
judgment – need only consult what was properly put before it by way of
Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses.”115

107

Id. at 118 (quoting Lackey v. Iberia R-V Sch. Dist., 487 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2016)) (emphasis added).
108
Id. at 118.
109
Id. (quoting Jones, 508 S.W.3d at 161 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)).
110
Id. at 118–21.
111
Id. at 119–21.
112
Id. at 120 n.8; see, e.g., Peck v. All. Gen. Ins. Co., 998 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999); Fleddermann v. Casino One Corp., 579 S.W.3d 244 n.8 (Mo. Ct. App.
2019) (“applying the summary judgment principles set forth in Jones, Pemiscot
County Port Authority, and Lackey.”).
113
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 118.
114
Id. at 119, 120 n.8.
115
Id. at 121.
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AFTER GREEN, MISSOURI LAW SEEMS TO STRICTLY APPLY RULE
74.04(C): THE BODY OF FACTS UPON WHICH A TRIAL COURT MUST WEIGH
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS LIMITED TO PROPERLY
SUPPORTED FACTS IN THE MOVANT’S STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED
FACTS AND PROPERLY SUPPORTED FACTS IN THE NON-MOVANT’S
RESPONSIVE FILINGS.116 SIMPLY PUT, GREEN SEEMS TO HAVE
ESTABLISHED THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD BEGINS AND
ENDS WITH THE NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS IN THE STATEMENT OF FACTS,
117
CLARIFYING A GRAY AREA CREATED BY ITT AND THE SUBSEQUENT
AMENDMENTS TO RULE 74.04.118V. COMMENT

The Supreme Court of Missouri’s Green decision left little doubt as
to its intention to formally replace ITT’s directive that courts consider the
entire record in summary judgment determinations. 119 However, by
making vague statements such as that courts “need only consult … Rule
74.04(c) paragraphs and responses,” the court left open whether courts
must only consider a summary judgment record consisting of numbered
paragraphs and responsive filings in compliance with Rule 74.04(c), or if
courts have the option to consider the entire record in front of it to find a
fact dispute that defeats summary judgment.120 Giving courts the option
to consider facts in the entire record would more closely align with
summary judgment procedures in federal courts and avoid the stricter
standard’s potentially perverse incentives.

A. Green’s Consequences and Its Potentially Perverse Incentives
The Supreme Court of Missouri noted in Green that “summary
judgment practice in Missouri is governed by Rule 74.04 and this Court’s
decision in [ITT].”121 The fact that ITT is one of the most commonly cited
opinions in Missouri regarding summary judgment validates this
assertion.122 It has been cited in 2,329 cases, 4,502 appellate court
documents, and 4,482 trial court documents on Westlaw, indicating that
Missouri litigators have become well-versed in citing to ITT as Missouri’s
summary judgment standard.123 Now, after Green superseded portions of

116

Id. at 116–17.
Id. at 117 (citing Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 508 S.W.3d 159, 161 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2016)).
118
See, e.g., Street v. Harris, 505 S.W.3d 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 116.
122
ITT Com. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp. 854 S.W.2d 371 (Mo.
1993) (en banc) (13,438 citing references on Westlaw as of Sept. 12, 2021).
123
Id. (13,438 citing references on Westlaw as of Sept. 12, 2021).
117
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ITT, many Missouri lawyers will be surprised to see a “red flag” next to
ITT on Westlaw the next time they go to draft a summary judgment
motion.124
Green’s framework may have created a new gray area that requires
additional case law to resolve. Specifically, there is a need for clarity on
what exactly Green tells courts they can and cannot consider in deciding
summary judgment motions. Does Green prevent the court from looking
at other evidence in the record that would show the alleged facts to be
controverted after all, or does it say that the court is not obligated to
consider such evidence, but can if desired? For example, the statement
that courts “need only consult what was properly put before it by way of
Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses” seems to suggest that courts have
the option of looking at other evidence in the summary judgment record,
but are not required to do so.125 However, support for the summary
judgment standard used by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Jones and
Pemiscot County, in addition to other cases cited in the Green decision,
indicates that the court in Green intended to preclude courts from
searching the record beyond Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses for
issues of material fact.126
The facts of Green support the view that the Supreme Court of
Missouri did not intend to give courts an option to consider other evidence
in the record. Because Green dealt with inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s own
exhibits that she filed to support her summary judgment motion, the
Supreme Court of Missouri seems to say that courts should ignore
contradictory statements in an exhibit that the movant has put in front of
them, simply because the movant asserts something different in the
statement of uncontroverted facts. 127 In other words, when analyzing a
motion for summary judgment, a court not only may, but must, ignore
affidavits that are already in the record, unless the facts from such
affidavits are included in the moving or non-moving party’s statement of
facts. Under a strict reading of Green, this is true regardless of whether
an affidavit clearly contradicts facts stated in the moving party’s statement
124
Id. (accompanying the “red flag” is Westlaw’s statement that ITT has been
“[s]uperseded by Rule as Stated in Green v. Fotoohighiam, Mo., August 11, 2020.”).
125
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 121.
126
Id. at 117–18 (quoting Jones v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 508 S.W.3d 159, 161
(Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (“[1] Facts come into a summary judgment record only via Rule
74.04(c)’s numbered-paragraphs-and-responses framework. [2] Courts determine and
review summary judgment based on that Rule 74.04(c) record, not the whole trial court
record.”); and Pemiscot Cty. Port Auth. v. Rail Switching Serv., Inc., 523 S.W.3d 530,
533 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (“Taken together, these summary judgment principles
require a court to ‘determine whether uncontroverted facts established via Rule
74.04(c) paragraphs and responses demonstrate [movant’s] right to judgment
regardless of other facts or factual disputes.’”) (emphasis original).
127
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 115.
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of facts. If Green is in fact taking the extreme position that Missouri courts
are prevented from looking at other evidence in the record that would show
alleged facts to be disputed, then it is a departure from federal practice and
may be problematic.128
This seems to allow moving parties to get away with directly
misrepresenting the record and leaves appellate courts with little recourse
to address such instances where the trial court purposely ignored
supporting exhibits not referenced in Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and
responses. Worse yet, this would seem to encourage parties to stretch the
truth in their statements of fact – as long as the other side does not properly
respond, the moving party will get away with it. Fortunately, the potential
for such abuse is limited; it only becomes an issue when the non-movant
fails to catch the contradictory facts and bring them to the court’s attention.
However, if the non-movant fails to diligently respond, as in Green, then
the court may essentially be forced to issue judgment on a patently
defective record. A rule that prevents a court from considering obviously
contradictory facts in the moving party’s own submissions could be
extremely problematic. There is likely a need for clean-up cases both to
clarify Green’s intent and to carve out exceptions to avoid such potentially
harsh results and perverse incentives.
Furthermore, it seems possible that Green will lead to even more
expansive statements of fact. If parties are concerned that anything not
referenced in a numbered paragraph of material fact will be strictly
disregarded in the court’s summary judgment decision, they may likely be
overinclusive in separating the material from the immaterial. Missouri
courts have lamented excessive statements of fact in the past. 129 For
instance, in Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heriford, the majority stated that
“very few claims or defenses have more than five or six material facts,”
but the court routinely sees statements of material facts with “well over
one hundred purported material facts.”130 While Judge Scott noted in his
dissent that he was “skeptical” of such a limited number, he noted that
“bloated” statements of fact create unnecessary difficulties for parties and
courts.131

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited materials,
but it may consider other materials in the record.) (emphasis added).
129
See Hon. Julian Bush, How to Write a Motion for Summary Judgment, 63 J.
MO. BAR 68, 69–70 (2007).
130
Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heriford, 518 S.W.3d 234, 240 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App.
2017).
131
Id. at 244 (Scott, J., dissenting).
128
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B. Green May Create Notable Differences Between Summary
Judgment Procedures in Missouri State Courts and Summary
Judgment Procedures in Federal Courts
While directly precluding Missouri state courts from searching the
record for controverted facts would be contrary to federal summary
judgment practice, it is possible that Green did, in fact, more closely align
Missouri’s summary judgment procedures with the federal system if
courts are merely given the option. As in Missouri courts, federal practice
requires that the non-movant set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 132 It is
not enough simply to rely on evidence in the record to avoid summary
judgment without specifically referring to the precise evidence that
supports the respondent’s claim.133 Moreover, even when evidence exists
in the record that would tend to support the respondent’s claim, if the nonmovant fails to refer to it, that evidence is not properly before the court.134
However, in federal practice, “the court need consider only the cited
materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”135 The court
is not obliged to search the record on the nonmovant’s behalf for evidence
creating an issue of fact.136 In other words, the federal cases on this issue
say that the court does not have to search the record for disputed facts, but
the court is not specifically precluded from doing so.137 Thus, Green’s
132

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d); see also Hernandez v. Jarman, 340 F.3d 617, 622
(8th Cir. 2003) (“[I]n opposing a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving party
may not rely on mere denials or allegations in its pleadings, but must designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”); Local Rules, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR
THE
W.D.
OF
MO.
38
(Effective
May
14,
2019),
https://www.mow.uscourts.gov/sites/mow/files/Local_Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/988R-G6KX].
133
Local Rules, supra note 134, at 38; see, e.g., Brandt v. Davis, 191 F.3d 887,
891 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in
an excessive force case because plaintiff failed to submit any evidence contradicting
defendants’ version of the incident).
134
Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003).
135
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
136
Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998)
(quoting Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915–16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992)
(“Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in
search of evidence to support a party’s opposition to summary judgment.”).
137
See, e.g., Skotak, 953 F.2d at 915–16 n.7 (“The district court was not
prohibited from considering the articles. However, Rule 56 does not impose upon the
district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's
opposition to summary judgment.”). It should be noted that in many of the cases on
this issue, the “record” that the courts are talking about is not the specific attachments
for the summary judgment motion, but documents attached to earlier motions. This is
different from the situation addressed in Green. Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d
113 (Mo. 2020) (en banc).
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statement that Missouri courts need not sift through the record to find a
factual dispute echoes the federal system’s sentiment. However, whether
the court must, or merely may, consider only what is properly included in
the summary judgment motion and response will determine how closely
Missouri’s standard now falls in line with the federal summary judgment
standard.
Despite the similar language and interpretation of the respective
summary judgment rules, any substantive comparison between summary
judgment practice in Missouri and the federal system, specifically
summary judgment grant rates, is limited. When Missouri adopted Rule
74.04 in 1960, it was practically identical to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (“FRCP 56”), which governs summary judgment in the
federal system.138 Thus, Missouri courts considered federal decisions
construing FRCP 56 as persuasive precedent in applying the Missouri rule,
139
and courts applied the federal rule and the Missouri rule nearly
identically.140
Over time, however, the historical difference between “notice
pleading” in the federal system and “fact pleading” in Missouri led to
divergent roles of summary judgment.141 The purpose of summary
judgment under Missouri’s fact-pleading regime is to identify cases (1) in
which there is no genuine dispute as to the facts, and (2) the facts as
admitted show a legal right to judgment for the movant. 142 Similarly, as
the language of FRCP 56 states, federal summary judgment is meant to
apply when there are no disputed material facts, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.143 However, summary judgment
also has historically had an additional function in federal litigation.
Because federal courts used discovery to identify the triable issues and the
facts upon which the plaintiff’s claim rests, pleadings have played a more
significant role in Missouri.144 Consequently, disposing of factually
insufficient claims tends to come at the motion to dismiss stage in Missouri
litigation, whereas in federal courts that typically must occur at summary
judgment.145
Because summary judgment has historically served a dual purpose in
federal courts compared to a singular purpose in Missouri courts, it has

138

Cooper v. Finke, 376 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Mo. 1964).
Id.
140
ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d
371, 378 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
141
Id. at 380.
142
Id.
143
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
144
ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 379–80 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47–48 (1957)).
145
Id. at 380; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
139
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been difficult to compare federal cases construing FRCP 56 with Missouri
cases construing Rule 74.04. 146 However, after two 2007 United States
Supreme Court cases – Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal – heightened federal pleading standards, there may be a gradual
convergence in the role of summary judgment in Missouri and in current
federal practice.147 A dramatic increase in the volume of federal motions
to dismiss after Iqbal indicates more of a corresponding role among
summary judgment in Missouri and in current federal practice. 148 The
combination of both a similar application of the respective rules governing
summary judgment practice and an increasingly similar role of summary
judgment in Missouri courts and the federal system may soon afford
opportunities to make more substantive comparisons, specifically between
summary judgment grant rates. Such a substantive comparison of
summary judgment practice between the two systems may shed more light
on the merits of a strict interpretation of Green – courts must consider only
what is properly included in Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and responses – as
opposed to a broad interpretation – courts have the option to consider facts
in the record beyond those included in Rule 74.04(c) paragraphs and
responses.
Regardless of how Green will impact the frequency of summary
judgment motions and success rates in Missouri courts, Green reminds
Missouri practitioners to tighten up summary judgment drafting to avoid
Green’s potentially harsh effects. Green made it clear that courts are, at
the very least, not obligated to scour the record to save a careless nonmovant from an adverse judgment.149 Because Green seems to go further
and mandate that judges consider only the numbered paragraphs and the
evidence specifically cited as support of each paragraph in determining
whether the facts establish a right to judgment, a non-movant must take
care to properly respond to each asserted fact and support any denials with
146
ITT Commercial, 854 S.W.2d at 379–80 (“As there is no need for our Rule
74.04 to fill in for an ineffectual motion to dismiss, the role of summary judgment in
Missouri differs significantly from that in current federal practice.”).
147
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009); see STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 402 (Erwin Chemerisnky et al. eds., 9th ed. 2016) (“[A]fter Twombly and
Iqbal, defendants might be more likely to file a motion to dismiss, believing the new
standard increases their chances of success.”).
148
See William Hubbard, The Empircal Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, COASESANDOR INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND ECONOMICS, at 5 (2016) (“Twombly and Iqbal have
led to a greater frequency in filings of motions to dismiss”); Ray Brescia, Legal
Scholarship Highlight: The Impact of Ashcroft v. Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
14,
2012,
11:56
AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/11/legal-scholarship-highlight-the-impact-ofashcroft-v-iqbal-on-civil-rights-cases/ [https://perma.cc/R8JX-CHDH].
149
Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Mo. 2020) (en banc) (citing
Lackey v. Iberia R-V Sch. Dist., 487 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016)).
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specific references to the evidence. Additionally, because any factual
reference in a motion for summary judgment must be contained in the
numbered paragraphs (or corresponding response),150 it may be wise to
make citations in the accompanying legal memorandum to the numbered
paragraphs – as opposed to the depositions or other materials. Thus, while
Green ultimately instructs trial court judges on what “record” to consult,
it also reminds Missouri litigators of the critical role played by the
statement of facts in summary judgment practice.

VI. CONCLUSION
ITT has governed summary judgment practice in Missouri for almost
three decades, despite revisions to Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure
74.04(c)(1)–(2) in 1994.151 Under ITT’s framework, trial courts analyzing
summary judgment took on a quasi-advocacy role, looking at the entire
record in order to determine if any genuine disputes of material fact
existed, even if neither the movant nor non-movant cited to such facts in
their summary judgment filings. 152 However, since the 1994 amendment
to Rule 74.04, there had been conflicting case law among the courts of
appeals regarding what comprises the summary judgment record upon
which trial courts should rely in their summary judgment assessments.153
Green superseded the ITT framework by establishing that “any court
– whether it be the circuit court addressing summary judgment in the first
instance or an appellate court reviewing an entry of summary judgment –
need only consult what was properly put before it by way of Rule 74.04(c)
paragraphs and responses.”154 However, it is still unclear whether this
standard prevents courts from considering other evidence in the record that
contradicts the statement of facts, or if it merely gives courts the option to
consider such evidence. While the implications of Green are unclear
beyond establishing a stricter standard for responding to and assessing
summary judgment motions, Green likely makes summary judgment more
attractive for Missouri practitioners hoping to capitalize on the
carelessness of a non-movant and score a victory for their clients.

150

Id. at 116.
Id.
152
Id. at 118.
153
See Fidelity Real Estate Co. v. Norman, 586 S.W.3d 873 (Mo. Ct. App.
2019); Street, 505 S.W.3d at 414; Great S. Bank v. Blue Chalk Constr., LLC, 497
S.W.3d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Osage Water Co. v. City of Osage Beach, 58 S.W.3d
35 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Peck v. All. Gen. Ins. Co., 998 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. Ct. App.
1999).
154
Green, 606 S.W.3d at 121.
151
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